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Abstract—Omitting resource-release operations in systems
error handling code can lead to memory leaks, crashes, and
deadlocks. Finding omission faults is challenging due to the
difficulty of reproducing system errors, the diversity of system
resources, and the lack of appropriate abstractions in the C
language. To address these issues, numerous approaches have
been proposed that globally scan a code base for common
resource-release operations. Such macroscopic approaches are
notorious for their many false positives, while also leaving many
faults undetected.
We propose a novel microscopic approach to finding resource-
release omission faults in systems software. Rather than gener-
alizing from the entire source code, our approach focuses on
the error-handling code of each function. Using our tool, Hector,
we have found over 370 faults in six systems software projects,
including Linux, with a 23% false positive rate. Some of these
faults allow an unprivileged malicious user to crash the entire
system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Any computing system may encounter errors, such as inap-
propriate requests from supported applications, or unexpected
behavior from malfunctioning or misconfigured hardware. If the
system’s software, such as its operating system, programming-
language runtime, or web server, does not recover from these
errors correctly, they may lead to more serious failures such
as a crash or a vulnerability to an attack by a malicious user.
Therefore, correct error recovery is essential when a system
supports long-running or critical services. Indeed, the ability to
recover from errors has long been viewed as a cornerstone of
system reliability [1], and much of systems code is concerned
with error detection and handling. For example, 48% of Linux
2.6.34 driver code is found in functions that handle at least
one error.
A critical part of recovering from an error is to release any
resources that the error has made incoherent or unnecessary.
Omitting a needed resource release can lead to crashes,
deadlocks, and resource leaks. Resource-release omission faults
are a particular instance of the general problem of checking
that API usage protocols are respected, that has received
substantial attention [2], [3], [4], [5]. A challenge, however,
is to identify the resource-release operations that are required.
Indeed, systems code manipulates many different types of
resources, each associated with their own dedicated operations,
making it difficult for any given developer to be familiar with
all of them. Furthermore, the protocol for releasing a given
type of resource can vary from one subsystem to another,
and can even vary within a single function, depending on the
resource’s state. Finally, systems code is written in C, which
unlike more modern programming languages such as Java, does
not provide any specific abstractions for resource management
or error-handling code.
In the context of the general problem of checking API
usage, a number of works have proposed to complement
fault-finding tools with a preliminary phase of specification
mining to find sets of operations that should occur together in
the code [3], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. These
approaches follow a macroscopic strategy, identifying common
sets of operations by a global scan of the entire code base or a
sufficiently large execution history. In practice, however, such
global scans result in many false positives [15], which in turn
lead to many false positives among the found faults. To reduce
the rate of false positives, specification-mining approaches
typically limit the reported results to the most frequently
occurring operations. The resulting specifications, however, are
insufficient to find resource-release omission faults involving
rarely used functions, which are typical of systems code.
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach that
specifically targets the properties of error-handling code (EHC)
in C systems software. We observe that when one block of
error-handling code needs a given resource-release operation,
nearby error-handling code typically needs the same operation.
Based on this observation, we propose a microscopic resource-
release omission fault finding algorithm, based on a mostly
intraprocedural, flow and path-sensitive analysis, that targets and
exploits the properties of error-handling code. Our algorithm
is resistant to false positives in the set of resource acquisition
and release operations, resulting in a low rate of false positives
in the fault reports, and is highly scalable. It finds resource-
release omission faults irrespective of the number of times the
associated acquisition and release operations are used together
across the code base, and is independent of the strategy for
identifying them. It focuses on whether a resource release is
needed, based on information found in the same function, and
is not led astray by information derived from other parts of the
system. As a proof of concept, we provide an implementation,
Hector,1 that uses heuristics and mostly intraprocedural analysis,
including a lightweight intraprocedural alias analysis, to identify
resource-related operations. Hector does not require any fixed
or user-provided list of resource-release operations and does
not depend on the most frequent results obtained by a global
scan, but still achieves a low rate of false positives.
1The first three letters of “Hector” are a permutation of “EHC.”
The main contributions of our work are:
• We highlight the fact that resource-release omission
faults in error-handling code are an important problem,
that may lead to crashes, resource unavailability, and
memory exhaustion. Much error-handling code is rarely
executed, making faults hard to find by testing.
• We show that existing tools for finding faults in systems
code are unlikely to find many of these faults due to
these tools’ reliance on the frequency of function uses
to reduce the number of false positives.
• We propose a resource-release omission fault detecting
algorithm based on the observation that patterns of code
found within a single function can provide insight into
the requirements on the rest of the code within the
same function. The applicability of the approach is
illustrated by the fact that in the considered systems
software, up to 43% of the code is in functions that
contain multiple blocks of error-handling code.
• Using Hector, we find 371 resource-release omission
faults in the widely used systems software Linux, PHP,
Python, Apache, Wine, and PostgreSQL, with a false
positive rate of only 23%. 52% of the found faults
involve pairs of resource acquisitions and releases that
are used together in the code fewer than 15 times,
making the associated faults unlikely to be detected by
previous specification-mining based approaches. We
have submitted patches based on many of our results
to the developers of the concerned software, and these
patches have been accepted or are awaiting evaluation.
• We find that 257 of the 285 faults found in Linux
cause memory leaks, while 9 can lead to deadlocks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents some examples that motivate our work. Section III
presents our fault-finding algorithm, and Section IV describes
the design choices taken in the implementation of Hector.
Section V evaluates the results obtained by applying Hector
to large systems software. Finally, Section VI presents related
work and Section VII concludes.
II. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
We first present some faults in error-handling code that have
been found using Hector. These examples reveal that faults in
error-handling code can have an impact that goes beyond just
the loss of a few bytes due to an unreleased memory region. We
then give an overview of error-handling in systems software.
A. Linux resource-release omission faults
We motivate our work using three representative crashes
and memory leaks derived from a variety of faults in Linux
error-handling code. One of these faults was previously found
by a Linux user; in this case, the bug report and Linux commit
log contain no evidence that the fault was found using other
tools. The other two faults were previously unreported; we
have reported them to the appropriate maintainers and provided
patches.2 The unreported faults involve rarely used acquisition
2http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/4/14/41, http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/3/230
and release functions that would be unlikely to be reported by
existing specification-mining based approaches.
Crash following a resource conflict. In January 2009, a
user of the Fedora Rawhide (development) kernel found that
installing the w83627ehf driver crashed his machine.3 Fig. 1
shows an extract of the faulty code. It performs a series of
operations, on lines 1, 4, 6, 10, and 13, that may encounter
an error. If an error is detected, the function branches to
the error-handling code (boxed) on lines 3, 5, 8, 12 and 15,
respectively. In the first three cases, the error-handling code
correctly jumps to labels at the end of the function that execute
an increasing sequence of unregister operations, according to
the acquisitions that have been performed so far. The error-
handling code provided with the ACPI resource conflict check
on line 10, however, jumps to the last label in the function,
which just returns the error code. The device remains registered
even though it does not exist, and subsequent operations by the
kernel on the non-existent device cause the system to crash.
1 err = platform driver register(&w83627ehf driver);
2 if (err)
3 goto exit;
4 if (!(pdev = platform device alloc(...)))
5 goto exit unregister;
6 err = platform device add data(...);
7 if (err)
8 goto exit device put;
9 ...
10 err = acpi check resource conflict(&res);
11 if (err)
12 goto exit;
13 err = platform device add resources(pdev, &res, 1);
14 if (err)
15 goto exit device put;
16 ...
17 exit device put:
18 platform device put(pdev);
19 exit unregister:




Fig. 1. w83627ehf driver containing an omission fault
(From drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c, sensors_w83627ehf_init)
Note that the error-handling code starting on line 3 correctly
does not release any resources, because none have been
successfully acquired at this point. Thus, flow and path
sensitivity are necessary to determine what resource-release
operations are needed at each point in a function.
Memory leak in the handling of invalid user inputs.
Using Hector, we found a previously unreported memory-
release omission fault in the autofs4 IOCTL function. As shown
in Fig. 2, the error-handling code starting on line 11 does not
release the resource param that was previously released in
the error-handling code starting on lines 6 and 8. Using a 9-
line program, we were able to repeatedly invoke the IOCTL
function with an invalid command argument, and use up almost
all of the 2GB of memory on our test machine in under one
minute. This fault is exploitable by an unprivileged user who
has obtained the CAP_MKNOD capability. We have verified
that an unprivileged user can obtain this capability using a
previously reported NFS vulnerability.4 Using this vulnerability,
an attacker, having usurped the IP address of an NFS client, is
able to create an autofs4 device file accessible to unprivileged
3https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show bug.cgi?id=483208
4http://lwn.net/Articles/328594/
users on the NFS server. Then, the attacker, connected as an
unprivileged user on each NFS client machine, can exploit the
autofs4 fault to exhaust all the memory of each client machine
by issuing invalid IOCTL calls, preventing other programs from
allocating memory and causing them to fail in unpredictable
ways. Reclaiming the lost memory requires rebooting each
affected machine. The fault has been present since the code
was introduced into the Linux kernel in version 2.6.28 (2008),
and is still present in Linux 3.6.6.
1 param = copy dev ioctl(user);
2 if (IS ERR(param))
3 return PTR ERR(param);
4 err = validate dev ioctl(command, param);
5 if (err)
6 goto out;
7 if (cmd == AUTOFS DEV IOCTL VERSION CMD)
8 goto done;
9 fn = lookup dev ioctl(cmd);
10 if (!fn) {
11 AUTOFS WARN("...", command);
12 return −ENOTTY;
13 }
14 ... /* more error-handling code jumping to out */
15 done:
16 if (err >= 0 && copy to user(user, param, ...))
17 err = −EFAULT;
18 out:
19 free dev ioctl(param);
20 return err;
Omission fault
Fig. 2. Autofs4 code containing an omission fault
(From fs/autofs4/dev-ioctl.c, _autofs_dev_ioctl)
Memory leak in the handling of an invalid file system.
Using Hector, we found a previously unreported memory-
release omission fault in the initialization of the ReiserFS file
system journal. The omission occurs when there is an attempt
to mount the file system and some parameters stored within
the file system are found to be invalid. As shown in Fig. 3, the
error-handling code starting on line 16 does not release bhjh
that was previously released in the error-handling code starting
on line 9. An unprivileged user who mounts a file system from
an external disk drive that has been previously formatted with
invalid parameters can trigger the fault. On a modern Linux
distribution, such a file system is normally mounted using
autofs, which imposes a delay between file-system mounts,
thus limiting the possible damage. Older systems, however,
may be configured to allow a user to mount such a file system
directly. In the latter case, as an unprivileged user, we were
able to use up almost all of the 2GB of memory on our test
machine within an hour, by repeatedly mounting the file system.
The fault was introduced in Linux 2.6.24 (2008), and is still
present in Linux 3.6.6.
B. Systems error-handling code
To assess the importance of error-handling code in systems
software, we consider the amount of code that is found within
functions that contain error-handling code and the kinds of
errors that are detected. We also study the usage frequency of
various resource acquisition and release functions, to estimate
the applicability of specification-mining based methods to
finding omitted resource releases. Our study primarily focuses
on the drivers, sound (sound drivers), net (network
1 bhjh = journal bread(sb, ...);
2 if (!bhjh) {
3 reiserfs warning(sb, ...);
4 goto free and return;
5 }
6 jh = (struct reiserfs journal header *)(bhjh−>b data);
7 if (is reiserfs jr(rs)
8 && (le32 to cpu(...) != sb jp journal magic(rs))) {
9 reiserfs warning(sb, ...);
10 brelse(bhjh);
11 goto free and return;
12 }
13 journal−>j trans max = le32 to cpu(...);
14 ...
15 if (check advise trans params(sb, journal) != 0)
16 goto free and return;




21 free and return: ...
Omission fault
Fig. 3. ReiserFS code containing an omission fault
(From fs/reiserfs/journal.c, journal_init)
protocols), and fs (file systems) directories of Linux 2.6.34,5
but we also consider a selection of other widely used systems
software, summarized in Table I.
TABLE I. CONSIDERED SOFTWARE
Project (Lines of code) Version Description
Linux drivers (4.6MLoC) 2.6.34 Linux device drivers
Linux snd/net/fs (1.5MLoC) 2.6.34 sound,network and file system
Wine (2.1MLoC) 1.5.0 Windows emulator
PostgreSQL (0.6MLoC) 9.1.3 Database
Apache httpd (0.1MLoC) 2.4.1 HTTP server
Python (0.4MLoC) 2.7.3 Python runtime
Python (0.3MLoC) 3.2.3 Python runtime
PHP (0.6MLoC) 5.4.0 PHP runtime
Both considered versions of Python are in current use.
Amount of code containing error-handling code. We
define a block of error-handling code as the code executed
from when a test for an error is found to be true up to the
point of returning from the containing function. The block
may include gotos. For example, in Figure 2, a block of
error-handling code starts on line 6 and includes the code
on lines 18-20 at the end of the function. Fig. 4 shows the
percentage of code found within functions that contain zero,
one, or more blocks of error-handling code. Depending on the
project, 28%-69% of the code is within functions that contain
at least one block of error-handling code and 16%-43% of
the code is within functions that contain multiple blocks of
error-handling code (shown below the horizontal dashed lines).
The latter functions are of particular interest, because in such
functions, it is possible to identify resource-release omission
faults by comparing the various blocks of error-handling code
to each other and determining whether they are consistent. Our
examples in Section II-A come from functions containing 7-14
blocks of error-handling code. The fault in the third example
was introduced when a function was reorganized, and new
error-handling code was introduced, showing the difficulty of
maintaining such complex code.
Kinds of errors encountered. The impact of faults in error
handling code is determined in part by how often the handled
5Linux 2.6.34 was released in 2010. We focus on a version from a few years
ago to prevent our contributions to the Linux kernel from the early stages of
















































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 5. Distribution of integer error-code return values
errors occur. It is difficult to automatically determine the source
of all the possible errors that may be encountered. Nevertheless,
48% of the blocks of error-handling code in Linux drivers,
sound, net, and fs return integer error codes, understood
by e.g. the user-level standard library function perror, to
indicate the error cause. We rely on these error codes to obtain
an overview of the reasons for the errors encountered in Linux.
Fig. 5 shows the percentage of the considered blocks of
error-handling code that involve the various constants used in
each of the Linux drivers, sound, net, and fs directories,
focusing on the top 10 such constants used in each case. The
errors associated with these values differ in their source and
likelihood. EINVAL is the most common value throughout and
indicates that the function has received invalid arguments. These
arguments may depend on values received from applications or
hardware, allowing invalid values from the user level or from
hardware malfunctions to trigger a fault. ENOMEM, indicating
insufficient memory, is the next most common value in most
cases. Running out of kernel memory is unlikely, except in
the case of low-memory embedded systems or in the case of
a system that is already under a memory-leak based attack,
and thus faults in such blocks of error-handling code are
unlikely to be triggered in an otherwise well-programmed
system. For drivers, the second most common constant is
ENODEV, which is also common in sound. ENODEV indicates
the unavailability of a device, as may be triggered by defective
hardware. Another common constant is EFAULT, indicating a
bad address. EFAULT is commonly used by functions copying
data to or from user space, at an address coming from user
level. A malicious application can easily construct an invalid
address, making the correctness of the associated error-handling
code critical.
Applicability of specification mining. Specification min-
ing approaches detect sets or sequences of functions that are
commonly used together and that are expected to represent
the required protocol for carrying out a particular task. Such
approaches typically suffer from a high rate of false positives
[15], and thus use some form of pruning and ranking to make
the most likely specifications the most apparent to the user.











Protocols with high support and confidence in Linux
Other protocols in Linux










Protocols with high support and confidence in other software
Other protocols in other software
Fig. 6. Support and confidence of the identified protocols
Common metrics include support and confidence, or variants
thereof [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], such as the z-ranking used
by Engler et al. [7]. Support is the number of times the protocol
is followed across the code base, while confidence is the
percentage of occurrences of a portion of the protocol that
satisfy the complete protocol. The specification-mining tool
PR-Miner [9], for example, which has been applied to Linux
code, has been evaluated with thresholds causing it to prune
fault reports where the associated protocol does not have support
of at least 15 and confidence of at least 90%.
Using the heuristics that we will present in Section IV for
identifying related resource acquisition and release functions,
we identify 2747 potential protocols in Linux, and 1051 in
the other considered software. Fig. 6 shows the support and
confidence of each, as determined by an intraprocedural analysis.
Each × or circle in this figure represents one or more protocols
with the same support and confidence values. For Linux, only
3% of the protocols have both support of 15 or more and
confidence of 90% or more. 88% have support below 15 and
58% have confidence below 90%. For the other software, only
3% of the protocols have both support of 15 or more and
confidence of 90% or more. 81% have support below 15 and
68% have confidence below 90%. The distributions are thus
quite similar at both the kernel and user level. Faults in the
usage of almost all of these protocols would be overlooked in a
specification mining approach using these thresholds. Lowering
the thresholds could significantly increase the number of false
positives. There is thus a need for a fault-detection approach
that can find faults in the usage of protocols that have lower
support and confidence.
III. OUR ALGORITHM
The goal of our algorithm is to identify inconsistencies in
the releasing of resources in a function’s error-handling code.
Inconsistencies may be intended, e.g., if the resource has not
yet been acquired or has been released in another way, or
may represent a fault. The main challenge in designing the
algorithm is to distinguish between these cases. Inconsistencies
identified as unintended are reported as faults. The algorithm is
microscopic in that it is primarily based on intraprocedural
information. It is made resistant to false positives in the
information about resource acquisition and release operations by
following a strategy of correlating information about acquisition
operations to information about release operations, within each
analyzed function.
The input to our algorithm is a function definition where
some statements have been already annotated as being resource
acquisitions or releases. These annotations are performed by
a preprocessing phase, which is orthogonal to our algorithm.
The preprocessing phase must also annotate each acquisition or
release with an expression representing the affected resource,
and annotate some basic blocks as being the start of a block
of error-handling code. A possible implementation of this
preprocessing is presented in Section IV-A, but it can be done
in any manner.
Our algorithm then works on the (intraprocedural) control-
flow graph (CFG) of the provided function definition, annotated
with the results of the preprocessing phase. As a running
example, we use the code previously shown in Fig. 1, focusing
on the resource pdev. Fig. 7(a) shows a portion of this code’s
CFG, starting from line 4, where pdev is first initialized. Nodes
are numbered according to the corresponding line numbers in
Fig. 1. A branch to the right enters error-handling code.
Given the annotated CFG, the first step of the algorithm
connects resource releases in error-handling code to the resource
acquisitions that can reach them. This is done by what
amounts to an intraprocedural live-variable analysis, in which
acquisitions are considered to be definitions and releases in
error-handling code are considered to be the only uses. In our
example (Fig. 7(a)), the release of pdev on line 18 (solid node),
which is part of error-handling code, is found to be live at the
acquisition of pdev on line 4 (shaded node), by following in
reverse the dashed edges.
Next, for each acquisition that is found to have at least
one “live” release, the algorithm walks forwards through the
function’s CFG, collecting each possible subset of the CFG
nodes that represents a path from the acquisition to any block
of error-handling code. For our example, starting from node 4,
there are four such paths, shown in Fig. 7(b-e). The resulting
set of paths is then divided into a set of exemplars, which
for some resource contain both an acquisition of the resource
and a release of the resource in error-handling code, and a
set of candidate faults, which contain an acquisition but no
corresponding release in error-handling code (annotated releases
prior to the error-handling code are possible). Exemplars are
truncated just before the block of error-handling code. In our
example, the paths in Fig. 7(c and e) represent exemplars,
because they contain the release operation, while the paths
in Fig. 7(b and d) represent candidate faults. In Fig. 7, the
exemplar and candidate fault in Fig. 7(c and d), respectively,
are marked explicitly. We refer to the resource acquired at
the beginning of any such exemplar or candidate fault as the
associated resource.
The algorithm then compares each candidate fault to each
exemplar, starting with the exemplar closest to it in the code,
as indicated by the line number, to determine whether the
exemplar provides evidence that the candidate fault should
release its associated resource in its error-handling code. In















































































Fig. 7. CFG and paths for Fig. 1
candidate fault in Fig. 7(d). A fault report is generated for the
candidate fault if the following conditions all hold:
1) The candidate fault does not return the resource.
2) The complete set of resource acquisitions reaching
the exemplar and the candidate fault both acquire
the associated resource in the same way. These
acquisitions may, but need not, occur at the same
line of code.
3) Any operation in the candidate fault prior to the error-
handling code that is annotated as a release of the
associated resource also occurs in the exemplar.
These conditions are motivated as follows. If the candidate fault
returns the resource (condition 1), then the resource should not
be released, and indeed the block at the end of the candidate
fault is probably not really error-handling code. Condition 2
results from the observation that we only have evidence that the
resources associated with the candidate fault and the exemplar
should be released in the same way if they were acquired in
the same way. Finally, if a supposed release operation found
in the candidate fault also appears in the exemplar, where it
is followed by another release of the same resource in error-
handling code, then the supposed release operation does not
really perform a release (condition 3). The set of generated
reports is then returned as the output of the algorithm.
The algorithm applies to our example as follows. The
candidate fault shown in Fig. 7(d) satisfies all of the conditions
for being reported as a fault. It does not return pdev (condition
1), it acquires its associated resource using the same function as
the exemplar (Fig. 7(c)) (condition 2), and it does not contain
any release of pdev (condition 3). Thus, the omission of the
release of pdev in the block of error-handling code starting on
line 12 is, correctly, reported as a fault.
As a second example, consider the code in Fig. 3 and the
acquisition of bhjh on line 1. One path from the acquisition
leads through the error-handling code starting on line 9. This
error-handling code releases bhjh using brelse, and so the path
is considered to be an exemplar. Suppose that another path from
the acquisition leads through the call to brelse on line 19 to a
later block of error-handling that does not release bhjh. This
path would be considered to be a candidate fault. However, it
meets only the first two of the conditions for reporting a fault; it
does not satisfy the third condition because it contains a release
of bhjh that does not appear in the (truncated) exemplar. The
algorithm correctly concludes that the call to brelse annotated
as a release on line 19 is an actual release of bhjh, and thus
no further release is needed.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We have validated our algorithm by implementing a tool,
Hector. Hector consists of around 3500 lines of OCaml code,
excluding the C parser and abstract syntax, which we have
borrowed from the open-source C-code transformation tool
Coccinelle.6 Creating this implementation requires implement-
ing a preprocessing phase and instantiating the algorithm with
various analysis strategies.
A. Preprocessing phase
Preprocessing requires identifying and annotating resource
acquisitions, resource releases, and error-handling code. Due
to the nature of the C language, this must necessarily be done
using heuristics. Our heuristics mostly rely on intraprocedural
information, making the implementation highly scalable.
A resource is typically represented by a collection of
information, and is thus implemented by a pointer to a structure
or buffer.7 Resource acquisition and release are typically
complex operations, and are thus implemented by function
calls. Hector recognizes an acquisition as a function call that
returns a pointer-typed value, either directly or via a reference
argument (&x), and recognizes a release as the last operation
on a resource in a path in the CFG. The result of a release
should not be tested, as release operations do not normally
report error codes. Finally, we ignore operations that have
constant string arguments, as such operations are typically
debugging code. To improve accuracy, within the file containing
the analyzed function, we identify resource-release operations
6http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/
7File descriptors, as obtained by open, are an exception, being represented
as integers, and thus Hector does not detect file descriptor release omissions.
open is, however, now rarely used, in favor of the more modern fopen,
which provides richer functionalities, and fopen returns a pointer. The Linux
kernel also uses pointers to represent its more primitive file objects.
interprocedurally. A function call that has an acquired resource
as an argument and whose definition contains a release of that
resource, according to the above criteria, is also considered to
be a release operation.
Some kinds of resources, notably locks, are not acquired
and released according to the above patterns, but instead
using a function that takes the resource as an argument, or
even takes no arguments. To account for these cases, we also
consider a function call having at most one argument as being
a resource acquisition, when the argument, if any, has pointer
type and is not involved in an earlier resource acquisition. The
corresponding release operation must occur in a block of error-
handling code and must include the same argument value, if
any, as verified by checking that the corresponding arguments
have the same set of reaching definitions.
Finally, in some cases a resource is released as a side-
effect of another operation. In Fig. 8, the resource kctl is
acquired on line 4. On line 12, kctl is passed to the function
add control to empty, which is the last operation on kctl before
the return on line 13. This call would not normally be considered
a release, because its value is tested. Nevertheless, kctl is never
again referenced on any execution path following this call,
neither on the success nor the failure of the test, and thus it is
considered to either release kctl or store it in some way that
makes a subsequent release in error-handling code unnecessary.
The latter is indeed the behavior of this function.
1 namelist = kmalloc(...);
2 if (! namelist) { ... }
3 ...
4 kctl = snd ctl new1(&mixer selectunit ctl, cval);





10 kctl−>private value = (unsigned long)namelist;
11 ...
12 if ((err = add control to empty(state, kctl)) < 0)
13 return err;
14 return 0;
Fig. 8. Extract of parse audio selector unit (From sound/usb/usbmixer.c)
Hector identifies a block of error-handling code as a
conditional branch that ends by returning an error value. Infor-
mation about the return value is obtained using intraprocedural
flow- and path-sensitive constant propagation. Error values
are specific to each software project, but typically include
NULL and various constants. In Linux, common error values
include negative constants, as illustrated in line 12 of Fig. 2,
and calls to ERR_PTR and PTR_ERR, as illustrated in line 3
of Fig. 2. Currently, the user must list these error values in
a configuration file (the only configuration information that
the user must provide), but we have developed a tool that
proposes a list of possibilities to the user based on the values
that are commonly returned in conditional branches. A block
of error-handling code might also return no value, or return
a variable whose value cannot be determined by the analysis,
as illustrated in line 22 of Fig. 1. In this case, a conditional
branch is considered to be a block of error-handling code if
the test expression checks for an error value and the branch
corresponds to the error value case.
B. Instantiation of the algorithm
The algorithm needs to connect resource-release operations
to the corresponding possible resource acquisitions, and then
to collect the paths in which an acquired resource is live. For
connecting the operations, Hector uses a backwards dataflow
analysis that takes into account alias information. Concretely,
the alias analysis considers statements of the form y = x,
y->fld = x, and y = f(. . . , x, . . .) as creating a possible alias
from y to x. Other possible alias-creating patterns could be
added if found to be needed in practice. For collecting the
paths, Hector uses a forward path-sensitive dataflow analysis,
again taking into account alias information. In both cases, the
analyses are flow sensitive and purely intraprocedural.
The need for path sensitivity is illustrated by the use of
pdev in Fig. 1. We have noted in Section III that the execution
path starting with line 4 and passing through the block of
error-handling code starting on line 12 is missing a release of
pdev and that this omission represents a fault. The execution
path starting on line 4 and passing through the block of error-
handling code starting on line 5 is likewise missing a release of
pdev (cf. Fig. 7(b)). However, the path-sensitivity of the path
collection process implies that the latter path is not reported as
a fault, because it includes a successful test that pdev is null,
implying that its value is different from the one obtained from
the successful execution of the resource acquisition on line 4,
for which a release is needed.
The need for alias analysis arises when an execution path
beginning with an acquisition of some resource x contains
e.g., y->fld = x. Alias information makes the path collection
process aware that x may either be released directly or be
released via a release of y, thus allowing a path that contains
either resource release to be considered to be an exemplar.
Finally, the need for flow sensitivity arises when a resource
is acquired and released more than once within a single function.
This is often the case of locking in systems code.
V. EXPERIMENTING WITH HECTOR
The goals of our experiments with Hector are 1) to
determine its success in finding faults in systems code, 2) to
compare the results obtained with those of related approaches,
3) to assess the potential impact of the identified faults, 4) to
understand the reason for any false positives and false negatives,
and 5) to understand the scalability of the approach. We evaluate
Hector on the large, widely used open-source infrastructure
software projects previously described in Table I, amounting
to almost 10.5 million lines of C code.
A. Found faults
As shown in Table II, Hector generates a total of 484 reports
for all of the projects. We manually investigated all of them
and found that 371, from 247 different functions, represent
actual faults. These faults occur in the use of 150 pairs of
resource acquisition and release operations. There are 113 false
positives. We study them further in Section V-C.
We first investigate the complementarity of our approach
with other approaches. Because we do not have access to
implementations of other C code specification mining tools, we
first assess our results in terms of the strategies and thresholds
TABLE II. FAULTS AND CONTAINING FUNCTIONS (FNS)
Reports Faults Faults Impact
(Fns) (Fns) per Resource Dead Debug
EHC leak lock
Linux drivers 293 (180) 237 (152) 0.0026 217 7 13
Linux snd/net/fs 92 (66) 48 (37) 0.0011 40 2 6
Python (2.7) 17 (13) 13 (11) 0.0007 13 0 0
Python (3.2.3) 22 (13) 20 (12) 0.0023 20 0 0
Apache httpd 5 (5) 3 (3) 0.0012 3 0 0
Wine 31 (19) 30 (18) 0.0009 30 0 0
PHP 16 (13) 13 (10) 0.0053 13 0 0
PostgreSQL 8 (5) 7 (4) 0.0010 7 0 0
Total 484 (314) 371 (247) 0.0018 343 9 19
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Other protocols
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Fig. 9. Support and confidence associated with the protocols in the faults
reported by Hector. The dotted lines mark support 15 and confidence 90%.
used in previous work. We then consider how many of the
faults detected by Hector have been found and fixed in practice
in Linux code.
Comparison to specification mining. In Section II-B,
we noted that specification mining approaches often rely on
thresholds defined in terms of support (the number of times
the protocol is followed across the code base) and confidence
(the percentage of occurrences of a portion of the protocol
that satisfy the complete protocol) to reduce the number of
false positives. In Fig. 6, we showed that most of the pairs
of resource acquisition and release functions identified by the
heuristics presented in Section IV-A do not meet the support
and confidence thresholds proposed by the specification-mining
tool PR-Miner [9]. Here, we focus on the subset of these pairs
of resource acquisition and release functions that are associated
with the reports generated by Hector.
Fig. 9 shows the support and confidence for the protocols
involved in our identified faults. The ×s and circles represent
the 150 pairs of resource acquisition and release operations
associated with the 371 faults identified by Hector. Protocols
associated with 52% of the faults found by Hector have support
less than 15, and protocols associated with 86% of the faults
found by Hector have confidence less than 90%. Indeed, only
7 pairs, marked as ×, have support greater than or equal to
15 and confidence greater than or equal to 90%. These 7 pairs
are associated with only 23 (6%) of the 371 faults found
by Hector, implying that 94% of the faults found by Hector
would be overlooked when using these thresholds. Indeed,
the well-known Linux protocol kmalloc/kfree, for which we
find 28 faults, only has confidence of 59%, as many of the
functions that call kmalloc have no reason to also call kfree. On
the other hand, reducing the support or confidence thresholds
used by specification-mining-based approaches could drastically
increase their number of false positives. Hector finds faults
independent of the support and confidence of the protocol.
Fig. 9 also shows as open rectangles the support and
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Fig. 10. Fixed or eliminated Linux driver faults. Bars on the left refer to
functions associated with 4 or more fixes. These bars are annotated with the
support for the corresponding acquisition and release functions. Bars on the
right refer to functions with fewer than 4 fixes and varying levels of support.
positives. None of these protocols exceed the thresholds of
support 15 and confidence 90%, showing the reasonableness of
these thresholds in a setting where false positives are very likely.
Otherwise, these protocols show a distribution similar to that
of protocols for which there are faults, with some having high
support or high confidence. These results suggest that support
and confidence are not very helpful in assessing these cases.
Comparison to faults fixed in Linux. Linux 2.6.34 was
released in May 2010, and thus some of the faults we have
identified have subsequently been fixed or otherwise eliminated
by other developers. We have furthermore submitted patches
for many of the faults detected by Hector, for Linux and for
other software. Fig. 10 summarizes the status of the 187 faults
in drivers that have been fixed or otherwise eliminated since
the release of Linux 2.6.34. The fixes include patches that we
have submitted and have been accepted (74), patches that we
have submitted but have not yet been accepted (23), patches
that have been submitted by others and have been accepted
(55), and faults that have disappeared due to reorganization or
elimination of the code (36). The faults in the third category
were primarily identified manually by developers, and thus the
involved functions may have low support.
72 of the faults fixed by ourselves or others involve the
common memory allocation functions kmalloc, kzalloc, and
kcalloc. Because these functions and the corresponding release
function, kfree, are well known, such faults could be found using
fault-finding tools such as Coccinelle, smatch, and sparse,8
that are configurable with respect to a priori known protocols.
These tools are regularly applied to the Linux kernel, and thus
the fact that such faults remain suggests a lack of attention
to the affected files by tool users or lack of attention to
the submitted patches by the associated maintainers. For the
remaining functions, only 30% of the faults have been found
and fixed by others. This shows that the strategies Hector
uses are complementary to existing maintenance approaches.
While many of these functions are used less often, within
the implementation of a given service, a function with few
overall call sites may be even more important than widely used
generic functions, such as kmalloc. Indeed, omitting a single
kfree typically results in the loss of only a few bytes, while
an omission fault associated with a more specialized function,
e.g., one that unregisters a device from the kernel, can lead
to serious errors such as resource unavailability and kernel
8http://coccinelle.lip6.fr, http://smatch.sourceforge.net/,
https://sparse.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/Main Page
crashes, as illustrated in Section II-A.
B. Impact of the detected faults
As illustrated in Section II-A, the kinds of faults we detect
can lead to crashes, memory exhaustion or deadlocks. Faults
can also involve omitted debugging operations, which do
not themselves cause a system crash, but can complicate the
process of debugging other errors, particularly those that are
difficult to reproduce.
Faults in Linux. We first focus on Linux, as this is the
most critical and long-running of the considered software
projects. The impact of a fault in error-handling code depends
on the probability that the function containing the fault will be
executed, the likelihood that the associated error will occur, and
the nature of the omitted operation. Table III classifies the faults
that we have found according to these properties. Linux kernel
functions vary in the degree of privilege required to cause them
to be executed and the number of times they are likely to be
executed in normal system usage, with read/write functions
being executed the most often and requiring the least privilege,
and initialization functions being executed the least often and
frequently requiring the greatest privilege. We furthermore
distinguish between static initialization functions, which are
only executed during the boot, and dynamic initialization
functions, for e.g., hotpluggable devices that can be loaded
and unloaded many times within the lifetime of a system. The
errors handled range from a lack of memory, which should be
rare in a correctly dimensioned system, to invalid arguments
from the user level, which are completely under user control.
Finally, we classify faults according to the effect the fault may
have: a memory leak (Leak), a deadlock (Lock), or inconsistent
debugging logs (Debug).
TABLE III. IMPACT OF FAULTS FOUND IN LINUX
Lack of Transient No device Invalid Total
memory errors or address user value
Leak 2 2 6 0 10
Read/write Lock 0 0 0 0 0
Debug 0 0 0 2 2
Leak 12 3 16 5 36
Ioctl Lock 0 0 0 1 1
Debug 0 0 1 2 3
Leak 16 9 46 1 72
Open Lock 1 1 5 0 7
Debug 1 1 8 1 11
Dynamic Leak 48 5 49 7 109
init Lock 0 0 0 0 0
Debug 0 0 2 1 3
Static Leak 12 2 14 2 30
init Lock 0 0 0 1 1
Debug 0 0 0 0 0
Leak 90 21 131 15 257
Total Lock 1 1 5 2 9
Debug 1 1 11 6 19
We first consider the faults in terms of the properties of
the containing function. Almost 40% of the faults found in
Linux code are in dynamic initialization functions, and this
ratio reaches almost 50% if static initialization functions are
included. Indeed, Kadav and Swift have found that initialization
functions make up 30-50% of the code of many kinds of drivers
[16]. 12 of the faults occur in read/write functions, which users
typically invoke repeatedly. A third of these faults depend in
some way on a file structure, which may depend on user-level
requests. Most of the rest of the faults depend only on internal
structures, making it less likely that specific user actions can
trigger the fault.
Next, we consider the faults in terms of the reason for the
handled error. Over half of the faults (No device or address) are
found in the handling of errors related to invalid arguments and
non-existent devices, represented by constants such as EINVAL.
Such faults may arise from invalid user requests or unavailable
or malfunctioning devices. 23 of the faults are found in the
handling of errors related to invalid values received from the
user level (EFAULT), such as invalid addresses for copying
data to or from the kernel, which are easy for the user to
construct.
Finally, we consider the effect of the faults. 9 involve
omitted unlock operations, thus introducing potential deadlocks.
Among the faults that have the most potential impact, in 1
case, the error can be caused by an invalid user-level value,
provided via an ioctl, while in 4 other cases the error is caused
by the inability to access a resource such as a file, the identity
of which may ultimately depend on user-level requests. These
faults may thus be exploitable by a determined attacker. In two
other cases, the error derives from malfunctioning hardware;
such errors may be more difficult for an attacker to exploit, but
can result in the inability to access related resources. Finally,
over 90% of the faults cause memory leaks. Of these, 88%
are in functions that can be iterated, and of these 5% are in
read/write functions that can be iterated by an unprivileged user.
These results generalize the examples presented in Section
II, showing that faults in error-handling code can potentially
have a significant impact on the reliability of systems software.
Faults in other software. To have a broader view of the
potential impact of faults in error-handling code, we have also
studied the impact of the faults found by Hector in the PHP
and Python language runtimes. Out of the 13 faults Hector
finds in the PHP runtime, 11 are located in PHP functions
that are called by at least 14 API functions (i.e., functions
that are directly exposed to PHP developers). Several of the
associated blocks of error-handling code are triggered by bad
argument values or malformed input files (images, in particular,
in the gd2 module). These blocks of error-handling code expose
PHP applications to memory leaks. Moreover, since PHP is
commonly used as a web scripting language, an attacker could
potentially provide faulty arguments to a remote PHP script or
upload malformed files in order to trigger memory leaks on
a remote server. Indeed, 7 of the memory leaks detected by
Hector pertain to persistent memory (i.e., memory that is never
released as long as the web server runs). For Python, 8 of the
33 faults found in Python code are in three Python 3.2.3 API
functions. These functions either are new since Python 2.7.2 or
have been completely reimplemented. Most of the remaining
faults are in initialization functions or in functions stored in
Python modules. Python manages internal data structures using
reference counts, and almost all of the faults involve omission
of a reference count decrement operation.
For PHP, we have designed a possible attack that exploits
a fault in the function xmlwriter get valid file path(). We
wrote a PHP script that calls this function via the PHP runtime
function xmlwriter open uri() a hundred million times with a
faulty argument that triggers the bug. Running this PHP script
on an apache2 web server results in an apache2 process that
uses up all of the available RAM of a 4GB server. An attacker
could use this fault in two ways. First, if he has the ability to
upload PHP files to the server in a directory where they are
interpreted by Apache, he can upload our script and access
it remotely to use up all memory. Second, if he finds a PHP
script on the server that uses xmlwriter open uri() with an
argument that is passed in via an HTML form, he can fetch
the page millions of times with a faulty argument until all of
the memory of the server is exhausted.
C. False positives
Table IV shows the number of false positives among
the reports generated by Hector and the reasons why these
reports are false positives. The overall false positive rate is
23%, which is below the threshold of 30% that has has been
found to be the limit of what is acceptable to developers
[17]. The reasons for the false positives vary, including failure
of the heuristics for distinguishing error-handling code from
successful completion of a function (Not EHC, 4%), failure
of the heuristics for identifying acquired resources (Not alloc,
26%), or for recognizing existing releases, whether via an alias
(Via alias, 29%) or via a non-local call (Non-local call frees,
12%), or unawareness of releases performed in the caller of the
considered function rather than in the function itself (Caller
frees, 13%).
TABLE IV. FALSE POSITIVES
FP Reasons





EHC alloc alias call frees frees
Linux drivers 293 56 (19%,34) 3 16 11 13 8 5
Linux snd/net/fs 92 44 (47%,29) 0 7 19 0 7 10
Python (2.7) 17 4 (24%,2) 0 0 3 0 0 1
Python (3.2.3) 22 2 (9%,2) 0 1 0 0 0 1
Apache httpd 5 2 (20%,2) 1 0 0 0 0 1
Wine 31 1 (3%,1) 0 1 0 0 0 0
PHP 16 3 (19%,3) 0 3 0 0 0 0
PostgreSQL 8 1 (12%,1) 0 1 0 0 0 0
Total 484 113 (23%,74) 4 29 33 14 15 18
FP = False positives, Rate = FP/Reports, Fns = Containing functions
The Linux sound, net, and fs directories all have false
positive rates higher than 30%. All of the sound false positives
come from the use of a single function that creates an alias via
which the resource is released. The affected functions all show
the same pattern, making these false positives easy to spot.
For net, 4 of the 6 false positives are due to error-handling
code related to timeouts, in which case it is not necessary to
release all of the resources. Again, the affected functions have
a similar structure. Finally, the fs faults are more varied, and
thus more difficult to identify. Still, there are fewer than 50
fs reports in all, making the identification of false positives
tractable by a filesystem expert.
D. False negatives
Hector requires an exemplar of the release of a resource
before it can detect that a release of that resource is somewhere
omitted. This exemplar permits Hector to find faults without
precise information about resource acquisition and release
functions. However, without an exemplar, no fault can be
detected, resulting in false negatives. Other potential reasons for
false negatives are analogous to the reasons for false positives,
e.g., failing to recognize a call that represents an acquisition,
TABLE V. FAULTS, FALSE POSITIVES, AND FALSE NEGATIVES, FOR
KMALLOC, KZALLOC, AND KCALLOC
Coccinelle Hector
Faults FP FN Faults FP FN
Linux drivers 38 28 (42%) 70 (65%) 86 10 (10%) 22 (20%)
Linux sound 2 6 (75%) 6 (75%) 7 13 (65%) 1 (13%)
Linux net 4 5 (56%) 1 (20%) 1 1 (50%) 4 (80%)
Linux fs 1 8 (89%) 1 (50%) 1 7 (88%) 1 (50%)
and considering a call to be a release operation when the called
function does not perform a release.
Estimating the rate of false negatives is difficult, because it
requires complete knowledge of the set of faults in a system.
Indeed, we know of no other fault-finding tools for systems code
for which false negatives have been investigated. Rather than
trying to identify all of the faults in our considered software,
we compare the results of Hector with an alternate fault-finding
approach that does not rely on exemplars. To reduce the amount
of code to study, we focus on resource-release omission faults
involving resources acquired using the basic Linux kernel
memory allocation functions, kmalloc, kzalloc, and kcalloc, for
which Fig. 10 showed that faults are common. We furthermore
focus on cases where the acquired resource is stored in a
local variable and is not passed to another function or stored
in another location before reaching the error-handling code;
these restrictions imply that there is a high probability that the
resource must be released before the variable referencing it
goes out of scope, and thus reduce the rate of false positives.
We have implemented this strategy using the open-source tool
Coccinelle [18]. Coccinelle does not implement a specific fault-
finding policy, but instead makes it possible to specify patterns
that are used to search for code fragments that exhibit certain
properties within the paths of a function’s CFG.
Table V shows the rate of detected resource-release omission
faults in the use of kmalloc, kzalloc, and kcalloc and the rate
of false positives, for the Coccinelle rule and for Hector. From
this information, we compute a lower bound on the number
and rate of false negatives by comparing the set of faults found
by each approach to the complete set of faults found by either
approach. While Hector has a high rate of false negatives, the
absolute numbers involved are small. Almost all of the false
negatives are due to the lack of an exemplar. There are only
three cases, all in a single function, where there is a failure
of the preprocessing heuristics, as a call is considered to be a
release when it is not. Furthermore, the Coccinelle rule also has
a high rate of false negatives, because of the restrictions noted
above to avoid false positives. These restrictions are indeed
only partially successful, because the rate of false positives is
up to 89%, and is consistently higher than that of Hector.
E. Scalability
We carried out our tests on one core of a 8-core 3GHz Intel
Xeon with 16GB RAM. Analyzing Linux drivers, which is
the largest considered project (4.6 MLOC), takes around 3 hours.
Over all the considered projects, the processing time, excluding
the parsing time, ranges from 0.0002 s/LOC (seconds per line
of code) to 0.0068 s/LOC. Apache, which is the smallest project
(0.1 MLOC), and Linux drivers, which is the largest, have
essentially the same processing time per line, at 0.0019 s/LOC,
showing the scalability of the approach.
VI. RELATED WORK
Our most closely related work is that of Weimer and Necula
on specification mining for fault finding [13], which also focuses
on error-handling code. They target user-level programs written
in Java, which provides specific abstractions for exceptions,
while we target systems code written in C, where error-handling
code is ad hoc. They search for pairs of functions a and b,
where the a functions may, but need not, correspond to our
acquisition operations, and the b functions correspond to our
release operations. For a given pair of functions a and b, they
require the existence of what amounts to an exemplar and what
amounts to a candidate fault, but do not require the exemplar
and candidate fault to come from the same function. Thus,
their mining process can be thrown off by local variations in
API usage protocols. In practice, on almost 1 million lines of
Java code, from 9 different projects, almost all of their mined
specifications are false positives, reaching a false positive rate
of 90%. To reduce the rate of false positives, Le Goues and
Weimer integrate extra information such as author expertise
[15], but doing so also reduces the number of found faults.
Furthermore, results are ranked according to statistics, so rarely
used release functions may be overlooked.
Sundararaman et al. also focus on faults in error-handling
code, by simply trying to avoid the need to execute error-
handling code, through the definition of an alternate memory
allocator [19]. We have seen in Section II-B that systems code
can encounter other kinds of errors, such as defective devices
and bad user-level values, which the approach of Sundararaman
et al. cannot address. Resource Acquisition Is Initialization
(RAII) is a resource management technique originating in C++
that exploits the ability to associate a variable with cleanup
code, which is executed when the variable goes out of scope
[20]. RAII eliminates the need for resource releases in exception
handlers, but has the side effect that resources are also released
on a normal function exit. The latter is too constrained for
systems code, where allocated resources must persist over
multiple requests by applications or hardware.
Engler et al. use static analysis to automatically extract
programming rules from source code, based on user-defined
templates [7]. Ranking calculated in terms of support and
confidence is used to highlight the most probable rules. The
approach can also use “must beliefs” derived from the user’s
knowledge of the semantics of the code, rather than statistics.
Such must beliefs are not available in our setting, where there is
a very wide range of resource acquisition and release operations.
PR-Miner uses frequent itemset mining to extract programming
rules, without using templates [9]. Results are pruned and
ranked according to support and confidence. MUVI applies
a similar strategy to find missing locking operations [21].
Kremenek et al. use factor graphs in inferring specifications
directly from programs [22]. Ramanathan et al. integrate mining
within a path-sensitive dataflow framework to identify potential
preconditions for invocation of a function [23]. In each of
these cases, the identified specifications can be used to find
faults in code. Hector does not rely on a separate specification
mining phase. Instead, it finds faults based on inconsistent
local information, rather than a global analysis of the software.
Hector can find faults in the use of protocols that occur rarely
and thus are likely to be pruned or given a low rank by other
approaches.
The tool Coverity,9 based on the research of Engler et
al. [7], [?], includes rules for identifying memory leaks as
well as other rules that are able to identify errors within error-
handling code. We have collected and categorized the entire
set of patches accepted into the Linux kernel between April
2005 and April 2013 that mention Coverity.10 Out of 523 such
patches, only 109 (21%) relate to error-handling code. Of these,
64 involve one or more missing occurrences of kfree and
16 more involve missing or duplicate occurrences of some
other function containing “free” in its name. 3 patches involve
functions whose name contains the substring “lock” and 3
involve functions whose name contains the substring “put”.
14 involve unnecessary error-handling operations rather than
omitted operations, and are detected as null pointer dereferences.
The remaining 6 patches involve a variety of other functions and
conditions. Hector has made it possible to find more than twice
as many faults, involving a more diverse set of functions, within
just one Linux version. While we do not know the version of
Coverity used by the Linux developers, nor the strategies used
by the Linux developers to decide which reported faults to fix,
these results suggest that our work is complementary to the
strategies used by the Coverity tool.
Wu et al. identify resource acquisition and release oper-
ations in Java code by interprocedural analysis of method
definitions [24], ultimately relying on a list of known release
operations. Ravitch et al. take a similar strategy for C code [25].
These approaches could be used in an alternative implementa-
tion of the preprocessing phase of our algorithm. Our proposed
implementation is mostly intraprocedural and does not require
advance knowledge of any resource-release functions; the latter
is an advantage for Linux, which manages a wide range of
types of resources and does not rely on standard libraries. The
analyses required are furthermore less costly, as interprocedural
analysis is limited to a single file.
Gunawi et al. [26] and Rubio-González et al. [27] have
studied faults in the detection and propagation of error values.
Our work is complementary, in that we focus on the contents
of blocks of error-handling code, while they focus only on
the return values. Banabic and Candea propose a strategy for
fault-injection prioritisation to perform run-time checking of
error-handling code [29]. The reported faults involve omitted
tests and duplicated releases, while Hector focuses on release
omissions.
Another approach to detect faults is to monitor program
execution. A dynamic analysis tool such as Valgrind [30]
only reports on real faults that can occur in real executions,
and is insensitive to procedure-call boundaries. Thus, it may
find some faults that involve interprocedural dependencies and
cannot be found by Hector. On the other hand, such a tool
can only find faults in the code that is actually executed, given
the available test cases. Forcing the execution of all error-
handling code would require developing an elaborate testing
framework, potentially involving multiple kinds of hardware,
depending on the application. Symbolic execution [31] coupled
with fault injection [32], attempts to address these problems by
making it possible to activate all execution paths. However, such




inference is provided. Thus, the developer still needs precise
prior knowledge of the various pairs of resource acquisition
and release operations.
Some other works use static analysis to find faults in Linux
code. Chou et al. [2] and Palix et al. [4] use patterns to
automatically find simple faults such as null pointer deref-
erences. Their techniques are not sufficient to find arbitrary
resource-release omissions in error-handling code because they
do not infer protocols. The rule INull, originally developed
by Chou et al. and which is also part of the static analysis
tool Coverity, checks for the dereference of a value that is
subsequently tested for being NULL. Like our work, INull also
relies on function-local consistency information, comprising
the dereference and the NULL tests. Nevertheless, the case
addressed by INull is simpler than that of resource-release
omissions, because the identification an operation as a NULL
test or as a dereference is unambiguous, drastically reducing
the possibility of false positives. In another form of consistency
analysis, Tan et al. [33] find faults by comparing code with
its expected behavior, described in comments. Comments have
been useful in assessing the faults reported by Hector, and it
could be interesting to combine the two approaches.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that error-handling code is a
substantial source of faults in systems code, and that such faults
can have a significant impact on system reliability. We have
presented a novel approach to finding faults in error-handling
code of systems software that uses a function’s existing
error-handling code as an exemplar of the operations that are
required. By focusing on one function at a time, while taking
into account a small amount of interprocedural information
from other functions defined in the same file, we obtain a
fault-finding algorithm that is precise and scalable. We have
implemented our approach as the tool Hector, and applied it to
find 371 faults in Linux and 5 other systems software projects.
A limitation of our approach is the need for at least one
exemplar of a given resource-release operation in the given
function. In future work, we will consider whether it is possible
to relax this requirement, e.g., to find exemplars in other
functions in the same file, or in functions that appear to play the
same role in the implementations of related services. Another
direction of future work is to consider how to automatically
fix the faults, based on the information in the exemplar, or
based on the history of the software as a whole, taking into
account how similar faults have been fixed in other parts of
the software over time. Finally, we will consider how the use
of local information can be applied to other program analysis
problems, such as identifying shared variables.
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